NRC Forms Special San Onofre Review Panel
http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/01/17/nrc…
snip
In reply to Mr. Silberberg: You sir are correct, we need MORE not LESS information made public in order that knowledgeable people can fact check exactly what is happening at SanO. To hide most of the data behind a veil of secrecy, is no longer acceptable especially since that practice is what has resulted in the current 1 to 1.5 billion dollar debacle at SanO.
This is the first time in the US Nuclear Fleet that what Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, (who also retired from the NRC staff) first described (what we now call the Hopenfeld Effect) as a cascade of SG tube failures, has actually been observed in a Steam Generator (See Response to NRR RAI -32 – Technical ==> Attachment 3 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGp…).
snip
“The concerns raised by Dr. Hopenfeld are extremely important safety issues. As the ACRS stated:
• Steam generators constitute more than 50% of the surface area of the primary pressure boundary in a pressurized water reactor.
• Unlike other parts of the reactor pressure boundary, the barrier to fission product release provided by the steam generator tubes is not reinforced by the reactor containment as an additional barrier.”
• Leakage of primary coolant through openings in the steam generator tubes could deplete the inventory of water available for the long-term cooling of the core in the event of an accident.
In the decade since Dr. Hopenfeld first raised his safety concerns, the NRC has allowed many nuclear plants to continue operating nuclear power plants with literally thousands of steam generator tubes that are known to be fatigue cracked! The ACRS concluded that the NRC staff made these regulatory decisions using incomplete and inaccurate information. After receiving the ACRS’s report, the NRC staff considered Hopenfeld’s concerns “resolved” even though it had taken no action to address the numerous recommendations in the ACRS report. The NRC must now formally address Dr. Hopenfeld’s concerns as soon as possible. In the interim, the NRC must stop making decisions affecting the lives of millions of Americans when it lacks “defensible technical basis” because the US cannot afford a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, due to RSG tube failures caused by poor design, fatigue or any other combination of reasons.”
— February 2, 2013 4:59 p.m.
Proposal that would ban nuclear power in California cleared to petition for 2014 ballot placement
From the web: Edison employees rack up millions in business expenses [http://taxdollars.ocregister.com/2013/02/05/ediso…]— February 9, 2013 3:22 p.m.
Filing: SDGE, SCE ratepayers getting shafted over San Onofre
Cont: Because the Hopenfeld Effect has now been proven as factual, the NRC must re-evaluated it’s “dated” thinking and its computer modeling about SG failures which now only allows for a single SG tube failure ASAP… In fact, I predict that time will show that a nuclear accident (not a nuclear incident) was narrowly avoided at SanO on January 31, 2012 only because of shear luck, due to the timing of the discovery of Edison’s poorly in-house designed replacement steam generators (RSG). Had that Unit 3 tube been just a tiny bit stronger and not leaked when it did; then with both Unit 2 & 3 back online when a MSLB occurred, we now know that it would have resulted in the complete venting of the core coolant within minutes… This is why what happened at SanO (as the locals like to say) is so important and why the NRC has to “get it right” this time; the safety of the entire US nuclear fleet depends upon it! Just as many basic design problems were discovered after the Fukushima tragedy, Sano has become the model of what NOT to do for all future RSG design engineers globally and demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt why having a qualified public review process is so important, especially where the risk of a radioactive “Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster” is involved.— February 2, 2013 5 p.m.
Filing: SDGE, SCE ratepayers getting shafted over San Onofre
NRC Forms Special San Onofre Review Panel http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/01/17/nrc… snip In reply to Mr. Silberberg: You sir are correct, we need MORE not LESS information made public in order that knowledgeable people can fact check exactly what is happening at SanO. To hide most of the data behind a veil of secrecy, is no longer acceptable especially since that practice is what has resulted in the current 1 to 1.5 billion dollar debacle at SanO. This is the first time in the US Nuclear Fleet that what Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, (who also retired from the NRC staff) first described (what we now call the Hopenfeld Effect) as a cascade of SG tube failures, has actually been observed in a Steam Generator (See Response to NRR RAI -32 – Technical ==> Attachment 3 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGp…). snip “The concerns raised by Dr. Hopenfeld are extremely important safety issues. As the ACRS stated: • Steam generators constitute more than 50% of the surface area of the primary pressure boundary in a pressurized water reactor. • Unlike other parts of the reactor pressure boundary, the barrier to fission product release provided by the steam generator tubes is not reinforced by the reactor containment as an additional barrier.” • Leakage of primary coolant through openings in the steam generator tubes could deplete the inventory of water available for the long-term cooling of the core in the event of an accident. In the decade since Dr. Hopenfeld first raised his safety concerns, the NRC has allowed many nuclear plants to continue operating nuclear power plants with literally thousands of steam generator tubes that are known to be fatigue cracked! The ACRS concluded that the NRC staff made these regulatory decisions using incomplete and inaccurate information. After receiving the ACRS’s report, the NRC staff considered Hopenfeld’s concerns “resolved” even though it had taken no action to address the numerous recommendations in the ACRS report. The NRC must now formally address Dr. Hopenfeld’s concerns as soon as possible. In the interim, the NRC must stop making decisions affecting the lives of millions of Americans when it lacks “defensible technical basis” because the US cannot afford a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, due to RSG tube failures caused by poor design, fatigue or any other combination of reasons.”— February 2, 2013 4:59 p.m.
Filing: SDGE, SCE ratepayers getting shafted over San Onofre
San Onofre is rated by the Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) as an INPO 4 Plant (The Worst Nuclear Plant Rating) and it should also should be rated in NRC Region IV Response Column V (Worst rating) and not in the NRC Response Column I (Best Nuclear Plant Rating). San Onofre is the worst nuclear plant in the country with the worst safety record, worst retaliation record, an INPO 4 rating and it is a mockery to place it in NRC Response Column I. NRC Region IV by listing San Onofre in NRC Response Column I, is putting its credibility on line and is displaying clear trends of collusion with SCE. It would be informative to learn who made the decision on San Onofre’s current ranking and why… If the NRC San Onofre Special Review Panel wants to be welcomed by Southern Californians at their upcoming February 12 Public Meeting with SCE , the NRC needs to change San Onofre’s rating to NRC Response Column V, which will reflect current reality instead of just wishful thinking. Definitions of NRC Response Columns: Column I – All performance indicators and NRC inspection findings are GREEN Column II – No more than two WHITE inputs in different cornerstones. Cornerstone objectives fully met. Column III – One degraded cornerstone (two WHITE inputs or one YELLOW input or three WHITE inputs in any strategic area). Cornerstone objectives met with minimal reduction in safety margin. Column IV – Repetitive degraded cornerstone, multiple degraded cornerstones, or multiple YELLOW inputs, or one RED input. Cornerstone objectives met with long-standing issues or significant reduction in safety margin. Response at NRC Agency level • Executive Director for Operations to hold public meeting with senior utility management • Utility develops performance improvement plan with NRC oversight • NRC team inspection focused on cause of degraded performance • Demand for Information, Confirmatory Action Letter Column V. Unacceptable Performance, Unacceptable reduction in safety margin Response at NRC Agency level •Plant not permitted to operate— February 2, 2013 4:57 p.m.
Haiku - A - Day
☯ 1-31-12 Radioactive leakage Almost disaster ☯ It's San Onofre's Shut Down anniversary Radiation Free ☯ Edison's failure Billion dollar debacle Nuclear near miss ☯ Why did this happen Poor NRC oversight Done behind closed doors ☯ How can we be safe With Leaders afraid to lead Of doing what's right ☯ Poor regulations Powerful utilities Ratepayer rip-offs ☯ Public trust failure Record corporate profits Energy swindle ☯ No radiation No nuclear waste No more anniversaries— January 31, 2013 7:26 a.m.
Task force formed on San Onofre restart plan
Cont: Because the Hopenfeld Effect has now been proven as factual, the NRC must re-evaluated it’s “dated” thinking and its computer modeling about SG failures which now only allows for a single SG tube failure ASAP… In fact, I predict that time will show that a nuclear accident (not a nuclear incident) was narrowly avoided at SanO on January 31, 2012 only because of shear luck, due to the timing of the discovery of Edison’s poorly in-house designed replacement steam generators (RSG). Had that Unit 3 tube been just a tiny bit stronger and not leaked when it did; then with both Unit 2 & 3 back online when a MSLB occurred, we now know that it would have resulted in the complete venting of the core coolant within minutes… This is why what happened at SanO (as the locals like to say) is so important and why the NRC has to “get it right” this time; the safety of the entire US nuclear fleet depends upon it! Just as many basic design problems were discovered after the Fukushima tragedy, Sano has become the model of what NOT to do for all future RSG design engineers globally and demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt why having a qualified public review process is so important, especially where the risk of a radioactive “Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster” is involved.— January 25, 2013 3:44 p.m.
Task force formed on San Onofre restart plan
One of the lastest comments to be moderated: In reply to Mr. Silberberg: You sir are correct, we need MORE not LESS information made public in order that knowledgeable people can fact check exactly what is happening at SanO. To hide most of the data behind a veil of secrecy, is no longer acceptable especially since that practice is what has resulted in the current 1 to 1.5 billion dollar debacle at SanO. This is the first time in the US Nuclear Fleet that what Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, (who also retired from the NRC staff) first described (what we now call the Hopenfeld Effect) as a cascade of SG tube failures, has actually been observed in a Steam Generator (See Response to NRR RAI -32 – Technical ==> Attachment 3 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGp…). snip “The concerns raised by Dr. Hopenfeld are extremely important safety issues. As the ACRS stated: • Steam generators constitute more than 50% of the surface area of the primary pressure boundary in a pressurized water reactor. • Unlike other parts of the reactor pressure boundary, the barrier to fission product release provided by the steam generator tubes is not reinforced by the reactor containment as an additional barrier.” • Leakage of primary coolant through openings in the steam generator tubes could deplete the inventory of water available for the long-term cooling of the core in the event of an accident. In the decade since Dr. Hopenfeld first raised his safety concerns, the NRC has allowed many nuclear plants to continue operating nuclear power plants with literally thousands of steam generator tubes that are known to be fatigue cracked! The ACRS concluded that the NRC staff made these regulatory decisions using incomplete and inaccurate information. After receiving the ACRS’s report, the NRC staff considered Hopenfeld’s concerns “resolved” even though it had taken no action to address the numerous recommendations in the ACRS report. The NRC must now formally address Dr. Hopenfeld’s concerns as soon as possible. In the interim, the NRC must stop making decisions affecting the lives of millions of Americans when it lacks “defensible technical basis” because the US cannot afford a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, due to RSG tube failures caused by poor design, fatigue or any other combination of reasons.”— January 25, 2013 3:43 p.m.
Task force formed on San Onofre restart plan
Two of the first comments post on the above link: The above Panel should N☢T be co-chaired by anyone in Region IV, since their supervision of Edison has been called into question and the panel should include at least one and preferably two outside experts to insure that this HISTORIC NRC/NRR Panel is not just covering up for the NRC (and Edison) to protect its own public image! FEI does not care about NRC internal politics, nor does it follow inter-office memo’s or yield to graft. and The issues involved in the SONGS steam generator encompass thermal-hydraulics and material science and technology. I am extremely upset and disappointed in the lack of judgement displayed by senior NRC management and the Commission in the glaring omission of the NRC Office of Research[RES] from playing a major role in this special panel. It is at times like this that RES was created by the Congress.to get an independent, confirmatory assessment of abnormal behavior in a nuclear plant.hThe Chairman should insist on the following additions to the panelOne staff expert on thermal-hydraulicsand one staff expert in material science. In addition two consultants from the unverities and or national labs serve on the panel, as peer reviewers. you can not win public confidence in your findingwithout these additions to the to the panel. Mel S. NRC RES Retired; former Chief of Severe Accident Research Branch.— January 25, 2013 2:54 p.m.
Task force formed on San Onofre restart plan
Downtown SD is within the 50 miles of SanO, as many locals like to call San Onofre. See all the great comments here about that: [NRC Forms Special San Onofre Review Panel][1] Feel free to add some of your own comments and then encourage all of your friends to do the same, these are getting read by many NRC "big shots"... [1]: http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/01/17/nrc…— January 25, 2013 2:50 p.m.
Edison, SDGE want secrecy in San Onofre dealings
Then San Diego attorney Mike Aguirre will take them to Court, with a smile on his face, because despite denials, the CPUC is part of the reason why there are problems with these replacement steam generators and if the CPUC was not enabling Edison to continue to collect 54 Million dollars a month from rate payers things would be very different at SanO.— January 24, 2013 11:43 a.m.