While the latest bout of terrorist attacks has set off a frenzied search for government responses by panicked politicos, one costly federal program left over from post-9/11 days has turned into a big bust.
So says a new report by the Government Accountability Office concluding that the so-called BioWatch initiative, employing high-tech sensors located in San Diego and elsewhere around the country meant to detect toxic terrorist attacks, should not get further upgrades until it's determined that the program actually works.
That could be painful for some San Diego military contractors, who have so far profited handsomely from the multibillion-dollar program that critics call a boondoggle.
In June 2004, SAIC, then based in La Jolla, was one of 14 firms tapped by the Department of Homeland Security to work on BioWatch, according to a Union-Tribune report, which added that the companies "will have access to $48 million for the first phase of research and development, which is expected to last 18 months."
The San Diego branch of Northrop Grumman has also been a major player.
"Automating the bio-detection process in these next generation instruments will provide much earlier warning of a bio-terrorism attack," Dave Tilles, Northrop Grumman vice president of homeland defense programs, said in a 2010 company news release.
"It will operate 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, in select cities across the nation. Earlier warning will allow the nation's public health and safety officials to reduce exposure, distribute medication sooner and proactively manage the response to a bio-threat."
Announced by George W. Bush in his 2003 State of the Union speech, "the BioWatch program involves a system of aerosol collectors deployed in more than 30 cities, as well as laboratory facilities and personnel to analyze samples from these collectors," notes the accountability office's October 23 report.
The current incarnation of the system, known as Gen-2, installed in 2005, "operated on an annual budget of nearly $87 million in fiscal year 2015," the document says.
"Gen-2 is designed to detect the presence of biothreat agents in 12 to 36 hours," according to the audit, but the National Academies of Science "questioned Gen-2’s technical capability in 2011, including its ability to detect attacks and the reliability of results that indicate a possible attack."
The ineffective program reportedly cost taxpayers a billion dollars by July 2012, according to news reports.
In response to the criticism came Gen-3, "potentially generating a result in under 6 hours” and eliminating “certain labor costs," but that program was cancelled in April 2014, "after testing difficulties."
Though the government "continues to rely on the Gen-2 system for early detection of an aerosolized biological attack," its equipment is wearing out, according to the GAO report, and officials will soon “need to make decisions about reinvesting in the program."
A July 2012 investigation by the Los Angeles Times found that Gen-2 was responsible for "dozens of false alarms in Los Angeles, Detroit, St. Louis, Phoenix, San Diego, the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere."
Added the story, "In an attack by terrorists or a rogue state, disease organisms could well be widely dispersed, at concentrations too low to trigger BioWatch but high enough to infect thousands of people, according to scientists with knowledge of the test data who spoke on condition of anonymity."
In addition, the audit says, "False positive readings can lead to major disruption from shutting down crucial transportation and economic facilities (such as airports and shopping centers—referred to as high-consequence actions) and to the unnecessary medication of an uninfected population—which can lead to adverse effects and medical stockpile waste."
Bureaucracy is also a major issue, according to the GAO report, which describes an elaborate hierarchy of alarms.
"Steps taken after detection, to instill confidence for requesting medication, include assessing known threats, conducting additional local lab work, and initiating a national conference call," the document says.
"The BioWatch national conference call usually occurs 1-2 hours after a local call of the BioWatch Advisory Committee. Thus, the time between an attack and when medication is fully distributed—and the number of lives potentially saved by minimizing this time—could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."
Thus, the GAO advises, the Department of Homeland Security should "not pursue upgrades or enhancements for Gen-2 until it reliably establishes the system’s current capabilities."
While the latest bout of terrorist attacks has set off a frenzied search for government responses by panicked politicos, one costly federal program left over from post-9/11 days has turned into a big bust.
So says a new report by the Government Accountability Office concluding that the so-called BioWatch initiative, employing high-tech sensors located in San Diego and elsewhere around the country meant to detect toxic terrorist attacks, should not get further upgrades until it's determined that the program actually works.
That could be painful for some San Diego military contractors, who have so far profited handsomely from the multibillion-dollar program that critics call a boondoggle.
In June 2004, SAIC, then based in La Jolla, was one of 14 firms tapped by the Department of Homeland Security to work on BioWatch, according to a Union-Tribune report, which added that the companies "will have access to $48 million for the first phase of research and development, which is expected to last 18 months."
The San Diego branch of Northrop Grumman has also been a major player.
"Automating the bio-detection process in these next generation instruments will provide much earlier warning of a bio-terrorism attack," Dave Tilles, Northrop Grumman vice president of homeland defense programs, said in a 2010 company news release.
"It will operate 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, in select cities across the nation. Earlier warning will allow the nation's public health and safety officials to reduce exposure, distribute medication sooner and proactively manage the response to a bio-threat."
Announced by George W. Bush in his 2003 State of the Union speech, "the BioWatch program involves a system of aerosol collectors deployed in more than 30 cities, as well as laboratory facilities and personnel to analyze samples from these collectors," notes the accountability office's October 23 report.
The current incarnation of the system, known as Gen-2, installed in 2005, "operated on an annual budget of nearly $87 million in fiscal year 2015," the document says.
"Gen-2 is designed to detect the presence of biothreat agents in 12 to 36 hours," according to the audit, but the National Academies of Science "questioned Gen-2’s technical capability in 2011, including its ability to detect attacks and the reliability of results that indicate a possible attack."
The ineffective program reportedly cost taxpayers a billion dollars by July 2012, according to news reports.
In response to the criticism came Gen-3, "potentially generating a result in under 6 hours” and eliminating “certain labor costs," but that program was cancelled in April 2014, "after testing difficulties."
Though the government "continues to rely on the Gen-2 system for early detection of an aerosolized biological attack," its equipment is wearing out, according to the GAO report, and officials will soon “need to make decisions about reinvesting in the program."
A July 2012 investigation by the Los Angeles Times found that Gen-2 was responsible for "dozens of false alarms in Los Angeles, Detroit, St. Louis, Phoenix, San Diego, the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere."
Added the story, "In an attack by terrorists or a rogue state, disease organisms could well be widely dispersed, at concentrations too low to trigger BioWatch but high enough to infect thousands of people, according to scientists with knowledge of the test data who spoke on condition of anonymity."
In addition, the audit says, "False positive readings can lead to major disruption from shutting down crucial transportation and economic facilities (such as airports and shopping centers—referred to as high-consequence actions) and to the unnecessary medication of an uninfected population—which can lead to adverse effects and medical stockpile waste."
Bureaucracy is also a major issue, according to the GAO report, which describes an elaborate hierarchy of alarms.
"Steps taken after detection, to instill confidence for requesting medication, include assessing known threats, conducting additional local lab work, and initiating a national conference call," the document says.
"The BioWatch national conference call usually occurs 1-2 hours after a local call of the BioWatch Advisory Committee. Thus, the time between an attack and when medication is fully distributed—and the number of lives potentially saved by minimizing this time—could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."
Thus, the GAO advises, the Department of Homeland Security should "not pursue upgrades or enhancements for Gen-2 until it reliably establishes the system’s current capabilities."
Comments